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TOWARD A MORE REALISTIC EVALUATION
OF THE UNITEDNATIONS
Gene E.Rainey
Harding College
Four months removed from India's conquest of the Portu-
guese enclaves, it is now possible to realistically —and perhaps
objectively —evaluate the impact of this event on the United
Nations. The doomsday prophecies have not been fulfilled,
viz., war over Dutch West New Guinea, British Honduras, and
Guantanamo has not occurred. Now that the death knells for
Ie United Nations rung so frequently in December have sub-led the international politician should embark on a soberaluation of the role of international organization in Americanreign policy.
Two Developments
The Goan invasion of December 16, 1961, sculptured in
relief two developments which necessitate a more realistic evalu-
ation of the United Nations.
(1) Multiplicationof membership.
The first of these developments is the oft-referred-to mul-
tiplication of United Nations membership, which may be di-
vided into three stages.
The earliest period spanned the beginning five years of
United Nations' existence, during which the United States em-
ployed the U.N. as an effective instrument of foreign policy.
The United States, with the approval of its N.A.T.O. allies,
with an almost unanimous support from Latin American coun-
tries, and a smattering of votes from the Afro-Asian nations, con-
trolled the majority on substantive measures brought before the
General Assembly. 1 As the Cold War began and worsened after
the founding of the United Nations, the United States relied on
the U.N. for a host of international problems ranging from
Russian troops in Iran to Communist aggression in Korea. 2
During this period, the American and Soviet delegates experienced
difficulty agreeing on new members for the United Nations:
therefore, only eight nations were added. 3
'Of the original 51 members of the United Nations, 14 were European, 22
Western Hemisphere, and 1 5 Afro-Asian nations.
case of Korea, the United Nations legitimized a policy of intervention,
hich the United States would have followed anyway.
3Two European (Iceland and Sweden) and six Afro-Asian (Afghanistan.
Thailand, Pakistan, Yemen, Burma, and Israel) nations were the eight.
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The second period of U.N. history is a transition stage.Chronologically, it began with the Korean War and was char-
acterized by a noticeable lack of induction of new members, andby further increase in the power of the General Assembly through
the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. 4 The authority of the Se-
curity Council continued to wane vis-a-vis the General Assem-
bly.
The birth of the third period of United Nations history
is precisely dated —December 14, 1955 —when East-West ap-
proval of sixteen new members broke the membership dikes.
This trend has continued down to the present day until the
geographical distribution of the United Nations' 104 members
shows 26 European, 22 Western Hemisphere, and 56 Afro-
Asian nations. Under these conditions, the statement of a Por-
tuguese diplomat aptly describes the American position:
Iam afraid your delegation in the United Na-
tions no longer organizes and creates majorities. It
seems reduced now to merely joining them. 5
While these words were spoken out of Portugal's bitterness
over the United States' lack of diplomatic action in the Goan
invasion, they have been increasingly true since 1955. The
U. S. successfully organized and created majorities only when
the Communist empire blundered (e.g., Russian suppression of
Hungary and Chinese conquest of Tibet) and on a subject clear-
ly defined as a matter of national security (admission of Com-
munist China). On other occasions, such as the General As-
sembly resolution on Angola, the smaller nations flexed their
voting muscles. 6 In regard to Goa, formidable opposition by
minor powers to action against India's aggression discouraged a
United States' plan to transfer the dispute from the Security
Council to the General Assembly after the Soviet veto.
•*The nation that joined the U.N. during this period was Indonesia on Sep-
tember 28, 1950. For a description of the "Uniting for Peace" resolu-
tion, see Everyman's United Nations, 6th ed., (New York: United Na-
tions Office of Public Information, 1959), pp. 75-77.
»New York Times, December 19, 1961, p. 19.
sThe General Assembly resolution on Angola was adopted January 30, 1962,
by a vote of 90 in favor, 2 opposed (Spain and the Union of South
Africa) and one abstention (France) . Portugal boycotted the debate. This
resolution urged Portugal "to undertake, without further delay, extensive
political, economic and social reforms and measures and in particular to
set up freely elected and representative political institutions with a view
to transfer power to the people of Angola." This was a stronger reso-
lution than the one approved by the Security Council six months earlier-
June 9, 1961.
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(2) Disputes between minor powers.
The Goan incident also points up a second —and much
newer
—development in the U.N. evolution: the inability of
collective security to solve disputes between minor powers.
Since 1945, enforcement of United Nations decisions has
resulted in a dichotomy. On one hand, the U.N. successfully en-
forced its willindisputes involving small nations while, on the
other, it failed in the all-important area of Cold War disagree -
iits between the two superstates
—the Union of Soviet So-
ist Republics and the United States of America. Is Goa a
w in the wind portending a break-down of enforcement ma-
lery on problems which heretofore have been solved? This is
>bering question for the friends of international organization
honestly answer.
IGoa is not
a clear-cut case of U.N. failure to solve a minor
>ute because the Soviet veto blocked Security Council action
complicated the issue. The U.S.S.R.'s attempt to make po-
al hay in the sunshine of colonialism injected the Goan ques-
iinto the Cold War, where it is largely out of place. Goa
t or may not represent a new trend in United Nations' evo-
on, a trend which heralds the decline of international or-
ization as an effective instrument for world peace. At a
limum, United Nations' efficiency is impaired and its pres-
damaged by India's action.¦ In a more optimistic vein, Ambassador Stevenson analyzedPortuguese-Indian dispute recently and recalled that
in December came the alarming military action
against Goa, in which armed force was used, in the
name of anti-colonialism but contrary to the Charter
—
yet without any action on the part of the United
Nations. Ispoke at the time of the very grave conse-
quences for peace if this most ill-considered step
should be taken as a precedent by others. Let us hope
that it proves no more than an aberration. 7
Iai Stevenson, speech delivered February 22, 1962, before the Woman'sational Press Club, Washington, D. C. (Mimeographed copy releasedr the United States Delegation to the United Nations.) This statementfar removed from the pessimism of Mr. Stevenson after the Russian-to on December 18, 1961, which prevented U.N. action on Goa: "In the only delegate, I think, at this table who was present at the birththis organization. Tonight we are witnessing the first act in the dramahich could end with its death." New York Times, December 19, 1961.14 389948 UN|VERS|TY OF ARKANSAS 51
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Consequently, two developments make it imperative that
a fresh look be given the United Nations. First, the machinery
created by the United States to use in the Cold War is now in
the hands of the non-aligned countries. Our post-World WarIIstrategy of increasing the power of the General Assembly
created a weapon which the United States can no longer aim
when fired. Second, the ability of the U.N. to solve disputes
involving minor powers is seriously questioned.
A Possible Alternative
As if anticipating the Goan invasion by several months,
Senator J. William Fulbright opened the door for reconsidera-
tion of the United Nations' role in American foreign policy.8*
Senator Fulbright's thesis is, simply, that the United Nations
has failed primarily because it was founded on the assumption
of unanimity among the major powers following World War
II. The "formidable threat of aggressive imperialistic Commu-
nism" dictates that the West forge a new unity—a Concert of
Free Nations. Mr. Fulbright was not alone in raising these
doubts before India's aggression, for Commentator Sulzberger
echoed the same theme when he penned the warning:
. . . by giving (the) U.N.more authority and at the
same time watching our own authority diminish in
(the) U.N. we edge toward an uncomfortable po-
sition. A few years hence we may desperately try to
extricate ourselves. 9
While attention should be given to the major contentions
of Senator Fulbright, it is also important to note his omissions.
For example, he does not believe that the United States should
abdicate its responsibilities toward the underdeveloped countries
of the world, for he envisions an "inner community" composed
of our N.A.T.O. allies and an "outer community" open to any
non-Communist nation. He does not advocate United States'
withdrawal from the United Nations, nor does he attack in-
ternational organization as a threat to American sovereignty.
And, finally,his Concert of Free Nations cannot be interpreted
as a "fortress America" concept in modern dress.
8j. W. Fulbright, "For a Concert of Free Nations," Foreign Affairs, v. 40
(October, 1961), pp. 1-18. For additional information on Senator Ful-
bright's views on international affairs, see John H. Burnett, "J. W. Fui-
bright. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Arkansas
Historical Quarterly, v. 20 (Winter, 1961), pp. 318-330.
sC. L. Sulzberger, "AnEmbarrassing Diet of Principles," New York Times,
October 5, 1961, p. 44.
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As a result, the more ardent disciples of international or-
nization find the Concert of Free Nations palatable. If the
nited Nations could be de-emphasized as an arena for East-
West disputes —a role which has given the U.N. its failures and
rounds for criticism—then it would receive the respite neces-
ary for evolving toward a more effective organization. Sup-
>orters of the United Nations should guard against overestimat-
ng the U.N. as the sole elixir for the deep-seated differences
lat divide the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Overestimating United
ations' capabilities will lead to overloading, and as Assistant
cretary of State Cleveland pointed out, "overloading can be
angerous." 10
The Domestic Setting
Unfortunately, the re-evaluation of United Nations' use-
fulness to the United States in the Cold War must take place
at an inopportune time, from a domestic point-of-view, be-
cause of the resurgence of ultraconservative sentiment. Current-
ly an assortment of criticisms which run the gauntlet from
concern over loss of sovereignty to the contention that the
charter was inspired by the Soviet constitution are hurled at the
United Nations. 11 However, as David Riesman has observed,
domestic distrust of the U.N. is not "merely isolationist jeal-
ousy of our sovereignty; rather, it is based on the belief that
any mediator tends to persuade the reasonable fellow to give in
to the truculent one." l2
While the Kennedy administration restudies U. S. policy
toward the United Nations, it is buffeted by groups opposed
1o"Up to a point, loading more onto the United Nations helps to enhance its
capacity to act. Beyond that point, overloading can be dangerous if it
makes the machinery creak too badly or exposes the executive to too many
different kinds of political attack at one time." Harlan Cleveland, "The
Road Around Stalemate," Foreign Affairs, v. 40 (October, 1961), p. 36.
Mr. Cleveland amplified the ideas contained in this article in a recent speech.
See New York Times, February 1, 1962, p. 6-
n"A part of that (Communist) plan, of course, is to induce the gradual
surrender of American sovereignty, piece by piece and step by step, to
various international organizations —of which the United Nations is the
outstanding but far from the only example —while the Communists
are simultaneously and equally gradually getting complete working control
I
of such organizations. . .. Until one day we shall gradually realize that
we are already just a part of a world-wide government ruled by the
Kremlin, with the police-state features of that government rapidly closing
in on ourselves." The Blue Book of the John Birch Society, 8th print-
ing, (1961), pp. 29-30. For additional comments on the United Nations
see W. Cleon Skousen, The Naked Communist, (Salt Lake City, Utah:
Ensign Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 265-269.
l2David Riesman, "Dealing with the Russians over Berlin," The American
Scholar, v. 31 (Winter, 1961-62), pp. 61-62.
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to international organization altogether. The danger is two
fold: that, first, President Kennedy will react to extremis
views and support an organization which no longer constitutes
a reliable instrument of American foreign policy, or second, the
administration willbe tempted to offer the United Nations as
a sacrificial lamb, ignoring its effectiveness on non-Cold "War
issues. Thus far, President Kennedy has been unwavering in his
support. "In my opinion," he said in a January press confer-
ence, "the United Nations justifies the effort we put into it
substantially." 13 Later he stated that, "I support the Unitec
Nations very strongly and Ithink the American people do...." 1*
While the American people support the United Nations
various developments during the past year serve to dampen
their enthusiasm. The American man-in-the-street is, by anc
large, a prudent breed and views with suspicion the financia
troubles at Lake Success. In addition, the chaotic tug-of-war
in the Congo and the misunderstood policy of both the Unitec
Nations and the United States are not helping matters. The
denial of membership to Communist China represents the only
tangible victory for "our side" which Americans can cheer.
Despite the trend toward a realistic evaluation of the
United Nations, a thread of idealism remains woven into cur-
rent thinking to remind the international politician of the ulti-
mate port-of-call of international organization. This segment
of the political spectrum holds the opinion that the United
Nations is the "only true alternative to war," to borrow the
phraseology of President Kennedy. 15 Walter Lippman chastizes
those who
like spoiled children wish to stop playing if they
cannot always win the game. But the grown-up view
of the United Nations is,Isubmit, that if the 50 new
members do not agree with us inside the U.N., in all
probability they would disagree with us even more
violentlyoutside the U.N. Those new nations would
still exist if there were no United Nations that they
could belong to.16
isNew York Times, January 16, 1962, p. 14.
i4\Vall Street Journal, March 22, 1962, p. 12.
« 'President Kennedy used these words in his speech before the United Nations
General Assembly, September 25, 1961, as reported in the New York
Times, September 26, 1961, p. 14.
isWalter Lippmann, "Indispensable Headaches," Lexington Herald, Decem-
ber 27, 1961, p. 3.
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The Question
I
American policy-makers face the challenge of preventing
rid War III.Inis Claude points out that the League of Na-
is was established to prevent another World War I(that is,
¦ by accident) ,but was incapable of stopping World War
Furthermore, the United Nations was conceived as a rem-
for future World War II's (that is, war by design) . Dr.
ude observes that the "United Nations could be interpreted
in attempt to equip the world for dealing with Hitlers—
r Hitler was already dead." 17 It is outside the capabilities
nternational organization mirroring imperfections of the po-
al scene around it to prevent a future atomic holocaust.
I
A realistic evaluation of the United Nations is not synony-
is with scuttling it. In spite of Goa, to use the crude but
riptive statement of Professor Stanley Hoffman, "it is too
jto throw in the sponge." 18 Nor does re-evaluation signify
the international politician is jettisoning his idealism. It
ns rather that we must, with a sigh, set aside the technique
yorld collecive security until conditions are more appropri-
This strategy will, in effect, shield the United Nations
ia disastrous fate which it does not deserve, but neverthe-
is prescribed by the realities of East-West conflict. The
ibility exists that, when the Cold War is ended, we will
rn to the process of international organization as one of the
lulas for eradicating war.
BiL. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares, 2nd ed., (New York: Ran-m House, 1959), p. 87. Also see pp. 43-50 for additional comments.¦nley Hoffman, "Popularity and Power at the U.N.," The New Leader,45 (February 19, 1962), p. 22.
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